The question persists: why will the uprisings in North African states not spread to countries such as Zimbabwe, and generally those south of the Sahara? Many cogent reasons have been given, but two key factors – in the case of Zimbabwe and SA at least – are being ignored: the legacy of apartheid and black economic empowerment.

It is intriguing, but not all that unexpected, that commentators seem to assume that upheavals in the north of the continent would also have a bearing on matters elsewhere. It is a demonstration of a myth about Africa: that it is a single entity, and  happenings in one spot should be quickly cast in terms of trends and new developments elsewhere on the continent.

This, of course, is not true. The North  and the rest of Africa are very different. Even south of the Sahara, in the Sahel, Muslim communities and Christians rub each other up so greatly that they are in constant and murderous conflict in several countries. And the Egyptians see themselves as special in North Africa too, Muslim yes, but not entirely Arab as the other countries in the Middle East.

I once made the mistake of raising a toast to an Egyptian editor during a press junket, calling him my fellow African. I almost caused a diplomatic incident, even though the guy had not struck me as particularly chauvinistic or conservative.

Paul Theroux has written how Egyptians point “vaguely south” when they talk about Africa, which is definitely not to be found around the upper reaches of the Nile.

The myth also has to do with African societies being similar to western ones in the same way that Arab societies are similar to them. In such societies uprisings occur when rebels march on city squares and set up barricades. Tahrir Square in Cairo was like the storming of the Bastille in Paris in that sense.

In sub-Saharan Africa, populations are much too rural and scattered. Or where they have been urbanised in teeming slums, these are too marginal, most being of fairly modern origin around the edges of cities such as Kinshasa or Nairobi.

Nevertheless, the rest of Africa has seen several deadly standoffs in the street – one would rather expect observers to have speculated about a trend the other way around, but they had not paid attention, as is often the case with Africa. In Guinea these led to the stadium massacre in Conakry that eventually brought the country its first democratic elections. In Kenya, the street violence had hundreds of deaths as its main outcome, but the message at least was that there is a street demand for democracy there too.

The clampdown by the authorities and armed forces has been offered as one of the distinguishing marks between Egypt and, for instance, Zimbabwe. In Cairo and Bahrain, the soldiers and  police stood down, in Zimbabwe they are engaged in a reign of terror.

This had been true for Kenya too, but elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa the army standing down was the first step to greater democracy – as in Guinea, and also in Niger, where the army deposed a president who was showing dictatorial ambitions.

Robert Mugabe’s repressive tactics surely is a key factor in Zimbabwe, but even more so is its peculiar geography – which is also the reason why the hundreds of service delivery protests in South Africa are unlikely to spread here either.

It is the legacy of segregation during Rhodesian times there and apartheid here in SA. Most townships or “high density areas” are some distance removed from town and city centres. Sailisbury and Harare used to be two separate urban centres. In SA poor black people still live predominantly in “lokasies”.

Apartheid’s grand designers ensured that these would always be situated to make military cordoning easier, often with a so-called “machine gun belt” between white town and black township. Roads were designed to make entry from one to the other difficult and laborious.

This legacy allows the heirs of the National Party, the African National Congress, to treat the service delivery protests – many, many more in number than anywhere else on the continent – with disdain and relative indifference.

The other factor undermining a revolution in Harare, is black economic empowerment. Traditionally, SA has always been a kind of default setting for all its neighbours. If you have personal or political trouble, you go spend some time in SA, which is easy as pie to get into.

Educated Zimbabweans very quickly after the crisis started in about 1998 discovered that they are much sought after in SA, where companies have to fill their black quotas, but have struggled to do because of a shortage in skills here and the job-hopping by many black South Africans. Zimbabweans had a well deserved reputation for skillfulness, creativity and dedication and would always be pliant workers.

Revolutions are run by the smarte sorts in a population, but most of them are happily working in SA and many have become citizens by now, not intending to return.

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